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NOTES
Extending Standing to Nonresidents-A Response to
the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation
I. INTRODUCTION
The potential role of governmental action in fostering economic and
social discrimination has become the subject of intensive and critical
examination. As a part of this examination, the existing structure of land
use controls has come under penetrating inquiry to ascertain possible
violations of newly enunciated constitutional standards. Zoning is the
major instrument of government control of land development in the
United States. Because of the decentralization of zoning powers and
their susceptibility to infusion of parochial attitudes, zoning laws often
exclude certain groups from socially homogeneous communities.
Unfortunately, however, the artificial, judicially created concept of
standing to sue usually prevents persons who are targets of restrictive
zoning legislation from invoking protection by the courts. Nonresidents
of a zoning municipality, for example, are generally held to lack
sufficient interest in the local land use regulation to challenge its validity.
There are indications, however, that this procedural obstacle is
beginning to crumble in the face of growing judicial awareness of the
need for local land use policies that comprehend the housing and
ecological necessities of people outside the local community.
This Note is premised on the belief that courts must recognize the
standing of adversely affected nonresidents to contest local zoning
ordinances in order to insure appropriate consideration of the issues
raised by exclusionary zoning practices in the nation's suburbs. To
support this premise, the Note surveys the current fragmented status of
zoning, the problems attributable to this fragmentation, and the
nonjudicial attempts to resolve the problems. In addition, the Note
analyzes the judicial approach to zoning fragmentation, with special
scrutiny given to the law of standing as an obstacle to efficacious judicial
review. Against this background, the Note explores recent developments
in the substantive law concerning exclusionary zoning and in the federal
requirements for standing and suggests a test for standing that
recognizes the interests of nonresidents.
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II. FRAGMENTATION IN ZONING
Since local government has been a powerful tradition in the
American political structure, it is not surprising that control over land
development has remained largely at the local level. This
decentralization of land use controls is consistent with both the original
rationale behind zoning -protecting the single-family residential
neighborhood-and the established localism in all aspects of property
law. Unfortunately, the local zoning process has produced
fragmentation in land use patterns resulting in intergovernmental
conflicts and exclusionary practices that are anathema to an increasingly
urbanized society. Existing methods of combating the insulary effects of
fragmented zoning have proved too restrictive in application to remedy
the weaknesses of parochial land use regulation in the metropolitan
situation.
A. The Present Zoning Structure
The states began to confer comprehensive zoning powers on
municipalities early in the 1920's.1 When the United States Supreme
Court first upheld the constitutionality of zoning in 1926 in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,2 the zoning enabling acts applied only to
municipal corporations.3 In response to the urban growth in the first half
of the twentieth century, state legislatures also gave zoning powers to
townships and counties.4 Notwithstanding this development, as late as
1950, land use control in metropolitan areas was principally the province
of the central city and a few large suburban jurisdictions. In subsequent
years, however, many local governments adopted controls and, by 1968,
some 6,880 municipalities and 2,004 townships had zoning ordinances.5
This extension of zoning powers, concomitant with the "Balkanization"
of the metropolitan areas into large numbers of local governments, has
I. Most of these early statutes authorizing local zoning were patterned after a model
published in 1924 by the U.S. Department of Commerce, commonly known as the Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act. The statute, now out of print, is reproduced at 3 A. RATHKOPF, ZONING AND
PLANNING 100-1 to -16 (3d ed. 1956).
2. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court upheld a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance even
though it reduced the value of defendant's land from $10,000 to $2,500 per acre. The Court regarded
zoning as an extension of public nuisance law designed to prevent the intrusion of industry and
apartments into single-family zones. Although current zoning techniques are far more sophisti-
cated, their primary purpose is still to protect the single-family residential district.
3. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, FRAGMENTATION IN LAND-USE PLANNING
AND CONTROL 5 (1969) (hereinafter cited as FRAGMENTATION).
4. Over half the states authorize counties or townships to enact zoning regulations. E.g.,
MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 125.201-.232, .271-.301 (1948).
5. FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 19.
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produced a chaotic situation in land use regulation in the urban setting.,
In the New York City region, for example, more than 550 individual
municipalities have the sole determination of land development policies.
7
-
In the five-county area surrounding Philadelphia, the majority of 238
cities, boroughs, and townships have zoning powers." Altogether, of the
7,609 municipalities, counties, and townships encompassed by the
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in 1968, some 68.3 percent had
adopted zoning regulations.9
The wide distribution of zoning powers would not be objectionable
if local zoning decisions affected only the residents of that jurisdiction.
In a cosmopolitan environment, however, zoning decisions have
considerable impact on persons and property throughout the region. The
fragmented state zoning also would be acceptable if the individual
community considered the land development needs of the surrounding
urban area. Unfortunately, the local governmental entities pursue
independent solutions to problems that transcend municipal borders"'
and establish largely self-serving controls."
B. Problems Accentuated by Fragmentation
The separatism engendered by zoning laws has greatly aggravated
the problems of urban growth. It is not contended that fragmentation in
zoning is solely responsible for existing land use problems. 2 It is clear,
however, that the diffusion of zoning responsibilities and the resulting
localism in land use controls have accentuated three major land
6. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 11-12 (1966).
7. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS OF ZONING AND LAND-USE
REGULATION 9 (1968).
8. Another illustration is the northeastern Illinois metropolitan region, in which 249
individual municipalities and more than 1,200 local governments of other types are making
independent decisions concerning land development policy. Bowe, Regional Planning Versus
Decentralized Land-Use Controls-Zoning for the Megalopolis, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 144 (1968).
9. FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 6.
10. See Aloi, Goldberg, & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell
for Home Rule?. 1969 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 65, 72.
I1. The use of local land controls for local gain can be attributed to 2 causes. First, zoning
decisions are made by government officials who are politically responsible only to residents of a
single municipality. Secondly, a growing demand for revenue has caused local units to engage in
competition for those land uses that offer monetary gains. See Note, Regional Development and the
Courts, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 600, 601 (1965).
12. One author has concluded that the chaos in land use planning and control is the result of a
number of circumstances, not all of which are peculiar to zoning: (1) the multiplicity ofjurisdictions,
(2) the variety of judicial attitudes toward the content of the "'general welfare" in the zoning fleid,
(3) the varying social attitudes toward zoning, and (4) the lack of a suitable alternative to local
control. R. BABCOCK, supra note 6, at 12-16.
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development problems that have characterized the nation's transition to
a metropolitan society. Before discussing the impact of fragmentation
on these problems, several general observations should be made. First,
the fragmentation in zoning is not only geographical, but functional as
well. 3 Secondly, the fragmented allocation of responsibilities for other
land use controls, such as subdivision control and planning, also has
magnified existing deficiencies. Thirdly, some of the problems are
attributable to the constraints imposed on zoning officials by their local
constituents, rather than the decentralization of land use controls.
1. Intergovernmental Conflicts.-The most obvious defect of a
fragmented zoning system, although probably the least significant in
terms of impact, is that it leads to conflicting decisions along borders of
local jurisdictions. A frequently cited illustration is the boundary street,
one side of which is zoned for residences and the other side for industry."
In addition to intermunicipal conflicts, disagreements also arise between
municipalities and county governments over the zoning of
unincorporated areas.'5 The primary cause of many intergovernmental
disputes is "fiscal" zoning, which is the use of zoning to solve public
financial problems. 6 This practice of manipulating local controls in
order to protect the revenue base results in an atmosphere of competition
for industry and commercial development in which little motivation
exists for making zoning decisions based on what neighboring
communities are doing.'
7
2. Placement and Operation of Regional Facilities. -Localism in
13. Functional fragmentation is a characteristic of government with specialized
bureaucracies providing specialized services with little or no coordination between them.
Meaningful solutions to functional separatism cannot be found by eliminating the geographical
distribution of powers because an organizationally fragmented structure will still remain. See
FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 20-22; Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling
Regional Land Development, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 7 n.14.
14. The hypothetical appears to have been derived from Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of
Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (L. Div. 1953), affd, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954), a
classic case of intergovernmental conflict. See note 54 infra and accompanying text. For a graphic
illustration of possible conflict situations see Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders,
1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 110-13.
15. Bowe, supra note 8, at 162. In the Chicago area the suburbs have joined forces against the
Cook County Zoning Board in order to protect the joint interests of the participating municipalities
against the granting of rezonings in nearby unincorporated areas. FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at
17.
16. Fiscal zoning has 2 objectives. The first is to encourage forms of land development that
minimize the need for services by the municipality. The second is to bolster the municipal tax base
by a land use policy designed to attract industry. FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 12-13, 29. See
generally Margolis, On Municipal Land Policy for Fiscal Gain, 9 NAT'L TAX J. 247 (1956);
Schmandt, Municipal Control of Urban Expansion. 29 FORDHAM L. RaV. 637 (1961).
17. See Aloi, Goldberg, & White, supra note 10, at 79.
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land use control also may adversely affect the location and operation of
public facilities such as schools, highways, and parks. Because zoning
fragmentation has so often interfered with the placement of public
projects, the federal government and a number of states recently have
acted to curb local discretion in these matters, especially with respect to
federally financed housing and highways.' 8 Although the dispersion of
zoning controls may no longer prevent the initial location of public
facilities authorized by these programs, local zoning decisions can still
seriously interfere with the operation of the facilities. 19 Local officials,
for example, could rezone land surrounding a highway interchange to
permit construction of a shopping center so that the community would
benefit from increased highway traffic. The resulting higher volume of
traffic generated by the shopping center would soon defeat the original
purpose of the highway interchange.
3. Exclusionary Practices.-Local decisions on the timing,
location, and content of private land development have magnified the
patterns of economic and racial segregation in metropolitan areas.
Many suburban communities, for example, have enacted exclusionary
zoning ordinances that explicitly or indirectly prevent the immigration
of minorities from the inner city.20 Although outright racial
discrimination in zoning is unconstitutional, 2' the same result has been
achieved by local zoning legislation that effectively excludes some
potential residents because of the increase in housing costs attributable
to the zoning ordinances. 2 These exclusionary ordinances are often
justified on the theory that they are necessary to promote public health
18. For a discussion of the various federal programs affecting urban and metropolitan
development see SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
METROPOLITAN PLANNING app.D (1964). See also Evans, Regional Land Use Control: The
Stepping Stone Concept, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1970).
19. See FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 22.
20. See generally Aloi, Goldberg, & White, supra note 10; Conti, Suburban Zoning Laws
Called Discriminatory to Negroes and Poor, Wall Street J., Nov. 27, 1970, at 1, col. 6; Sager,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. RaV.
767 (1969). There is creditable evidence that the number of exclusionary ordinances in existence is
high. In Connecticut, for example, 60% of all undeveloped land is zoned for minimum lot sizes
between one and two acres. Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning: A Method of
Analysis. 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 263, 295 n.66.
21. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (ordinance that made it unlawful for any white
or black to move into any house on any block in which greater number of houses were occupied by
persons of an opposite color held invalid).
22. Since most of the lower income segment of the American population are minorities, any
type of economic segregation also brings about racial and ethnic segregation. See Williams,
Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 317, 330 (1955).But see Morris,
Living Together, Wall Street J., Dec. 28, 1970, at 1, col. I (stating that Negroes are moving to the
suburbs in unprecedented numbers despite zoning barriers).
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and safety,2 to balance public services with demand, and to preserve
property values.24 It is apparent, however, that these restrictions also
reflect a strong motivation for preserving homogeneity and amenity in
local communities. Three zoning techniques have been employed to
exclude undesired groups from suburban communities.21 First, since
zoning enabling statutes usually authorize regulation of building size,26
municipalities have imposed minimum floor space requirements on
residential dwellings. Secondly, many localities have relied on their
authority to regulate population density as a justification for imposing
large acreage requirements in residential developments.2 7 Thirdly,
suburban communities have frequently adopted zoning ordinances that
exclude multi-family housing units.
The economic and social consequences of these exclusionary
practices are several. Most importantly, the reduction in the supply of
low-cost housing excludes low-income groups from job opportunities in
suburbs that are not within commuting distance of the core city.2
Moreover, by narrowing the selection of housing, these practices tave
placed the excluded groups at the mercy of the inner-city slumlord. 2'
Finally, exclusionary zoning is a formidable barrier to socio-economic
integration in residential areas, a consequence that raises issues
analogous to the "de facto segregation" problem in public education.
30
C. Methods to Combat Fragmentation
The impact of fragmented land use controls in metropolitan areas
has led to the development of a variety of remedial measures and
programs. In addition, many untried methods for controlling regional
23. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, ZONING CONTROVERSIES IN THE
SUBURBS: THREE CASE STUDIES 73-74 (1968).
24. The arguments for these zoning techniques are discussed at length in Sager, supra note 20,
at 793-98. See also Becker, supra note 20, at 281-89. For evidence that integration of a suburban
municipality does not drive property values downward see Morris, supra note 22.
25. Bowe, supra note 8, at 150-58.
26. Note, Snob Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low Density
Zoning, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 507,511 (1964).
27. Becker, supra note 20, at 279 n.26.
28. The Department of Labor pinpointed this development as one of the prime causes of the
failure to match available jobs with available personnel. Bowe, supra note 8, at 158 n.60. "It isn't
solely the issue of discrimination that concerns civil rights groups. It is also a question of jobs.
When companies move away from a city to a suburb with no living space for blue-collar workers the
worker has no option of either traveling to the job from the city or else quitting. In too many
instances, civil rights groups say, he's had to quit, and this in turn has contributed to unemployment
in city areas." Conti, supra note 20, at 7, col. 4-5.
29. Sager, supra note 20, at 78 1.
30. See note 22 supra.
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land development have been urged. Unfortunately, the existing programs
are generally ineffective and the untried proposals appear years away
from general enactment.
1. Existing Methods to Combat Fragmentation.-Many
programs attempt to eliminate the problems of localism in zoning by
encouraging cooperation between local governments. Significantly, these
arrangements do not diminish local powers and in some instances
actually broaden them. These methods include a council of governments,
local planning assistance, county zoning of unincorporated territory,
and extraterritorial zoning. A council of governments is a voluntary
association of area governments for the solution of common problems.
Although this approach to regional problems is relatively new, more
than 100 councils presently are functioning in 34 states. 31 Since the
council of government framework is based on voluntary cooperation and
voting equality among governments, however, it seems doubtful that this
method will lead to significant changes. Local planning assistance
provided by metropolitan planning agencies is another method to cope
with separatism. The extent of assistance varies from simply providing
advice to preparing comprehensive plans.3 2 Since the assistance is
advisory only, it does not insure adoption of municipal policies that will
implement regional objectives. 33 A few states have provided for
participation of county governments in zoning activities. Although
county-wide controls provide some regional perspective, these efforts
have been frustrated by the clash of interests between county and
municipality.3 4  Many states permit municipalities to control
development of land on their boundaries by zoning extraterritorially up
to five miles.3 This grant of extraterritorial power, however, does not
insure that the municipality will consider regional interests in zoning.36
31. For detailed data relating to regional variations in the use of council of governments, the
nature of their functions, and some observations about their effectiveness see FRAGMENTATION,
supra note 3, at 32-38.
32. For local planning assistance information see FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 46-48.
33. The federal government has adopted an important program, commonly known as the 701
program, designed to assist local agencies in comprehensive planning and encourage cooperation
between jurisdictions. Housing Act of 1954 § 701, 40 U.S.C. § 461 (1964).
34. See Bowe, supra note 8, at 162.
35. See generally Bartelt, Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections on its Validity, 32 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 367 (1957); Bouwsma, Validity of Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning, 8 VAND. L. REV.
806 (1955).
36. Moreover, the powers themselves are severely limited. In most states these extraterritorial
powers do not extend to land located within another incorporated community and in some instances




In practice, the communities with extraterritorial powers have usually
zoned to protect their interests from surrounding communities.
Other arrangements attempt to emphasize regional considerations
in zoning by reducing the discretion of local governments. These
measure include regional planning agencies, state-administered land use
controls, and metropolitan government. Regional planning agencies
have been adopted in the majority of states to examine and approve local
decisions of regional significance,3 7 but they have had minimal effect
because of their lack of enforcement powers.3 Even though the states are
the ultimate repositories of zoning powers, only a few have taken an
active role in administering land use controls. One state requires a
county to submit a proposed zoning ordinance to the state planning
director for advice; another state is presently adopting land use
regulations at the local level.39 Unfortunately, more substantial state
participation does not appear to be forthcoming.40 Metropolitan
37. Enabling legislation authorizing metropolitan or regional planning has been passed in all
but 4 states. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 13.201-12 (1955). The statutory approaches are numerous,
but typically extend the planning authority of a municipality to a specified area beyond its own
perimeter. For an analysis of this legislation that highlights similarities and differences see
SUBCOMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 48-66. See also Haar,
Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1957); Melli & Devoy,
Extraterritorial Planning and Urban Growth, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 55; Wegner, The Value and Role
of Regional Planning, 7 INST. PLANNING & ZONING 199 (1968); Note, The Regional Approach to
Planning, 50 IOWA L. REV. 582 (1965).
38. "Although not unfair, it is perhaps unkind to characterize these regional planning
enabling statutes as high sounding but hollow moral victories. As presently formulated they are
directed to making a regional plan, but not one fashioned to an end; nor is there a bridge by which
the plan can influence land development . . . . Certainly the procedures for adoption are not
devised with the thought of stimulating discussion, of awakening wide public response, and of
having the final acceptance of the plan, which after all sets basic goals that affect the lives of the
citizens in many intimate ways, a matter of public concern. Without such clarification, there is
small hope for a reconciliation of divergent interests, without which planning becomes simply a
pleasant intellectual hobby." Haar, supra note 37, at 522.
39. Hawaii has a state land use commission that supervises land use controls throughout the
state. Since the conditions in that state differ from those on the mainland, the Hawaiian approach
has limited relevance. See FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 58.
40. President Nixon will propose to the 92d Congress a national land use policy that would
give the states broad powers to control the use of land within their borders. Under the proposed land
use legislation, which was formulated by the President's Council on Environmental Quality, the 50
states would be encouraged by federal financial policies to develop state land planning and
conservation programs that would assure controlled development of land within areas of critical
environmental concern and prevent local regulations from restricting development of regional
benefit. Certification of the state programs by the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
which would have primary responsibility for administering the national policy, would entitle the
states to matching funds to assist them in their land development plans. A major concern of the
national policy would be to overcome exclusionary practices of some local jurisdictions in favor of
nonresident public access to municipally owned beaches, multi-family dwellings, publicly assisted
housing, and educational institutions. See Karmin, Nixon to Ask "'National Land Use Policy"
Giving States Wide Control Under HUD, Wall Street J., Jan. 20, 1971, at 6, col. 1-2.
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government is the most drastic response to the problems caused by
fragmentation in land use regulation. Because the transfer of control
powers to a metropolitan government has occurred in only a few areas4
1
and these experiences have limited applicability, it is difficult to evaluate
fully the impact of this approach on regional development.
2. Proposed Methods to Combat Fragmentation.-Of the
numerous untried proposals for dealing with localism in land use
regulation, only three appear to have any likelihood of success. One
recommendation is the creation of area-wide commissions to review the
impact of local decision-making on area land development.4 2 If the
disadvantages to the area outweigh the interests of the municipality, the
commission would be empowered to overturn local regulations. Such a
reviewing agency would undoubtedly impel regional considerations in
municipal decisions, but only in the negative manner of vetoing
judgments already made. The second proposal calls for focusing
authority in the core city to regulate land use for the entire metropolitan
area.43 This delegation of extraterritorial powers over suburban
.communities to the central city is premised on the communities'
substantial dependence upon the urban center. Even though the
implementation of this suggestion would likely reduce intergovernmental
conflicts, it is inconsistent with the primacy placed on local
representation in the United States. The third method proposed as a
remedy for the problems of fragmentation is the creation by the federal
government of "new towns" with more responsive zoning.44 Since the
construction of completely new towns would require enormous capital
investment, however, this suggestion will probably not be enacted in a
time of more pressing financial demands.
41. The Nashville experience is worthy of note. When the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County was inaugurated in 1963, the Metropolitan Planning Commission
was given broad powers in the areas of planning-zoning-subdivision regulation and capital
improvements programming and budgeting. Significant advances in regional development have
been made in the last 7 years. For a discussion of the inferences that can be drawn from this
regionalization of land use controls see FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 39-46.
42. One author has suggested the creation of state-wide administrative agencies to supervise
decisions of local authorities in land use matters. R. BABCOCK, supra note 6, at 166-73. A regional
agency would do just as well.
43. See Becker, supra note 13, at 24.
44. In 1965 the Johnson Administration asked for authority to provide low interest loans to
the states for acquisition of land for "new town" sites for the development of new and separated
cities. The proposal was defeated because of pressure placed on Congress to preserve suburban
autonomy and prevent metropolitan government. See Bowe, supra note 8, at 164-65; Evans, supra
note 18, at 16.
19711
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
III. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO ZONING FRAGMENTATION
Only in recent years have the courts recognized the role of zoning
fragmentation in accentuating urban problems. Moreover, most courts
have been reluctant to consider regional circumstances in zoning cases.
In the few instances in which regional perspectives have been applied, the
courts have relied on them primarily for the purpose of sustaining local
zoning ordinances. The failure of courts to invalidate zoning practices
that clearly conflict with legitimate regional interests, however, is mainly
attributable to the procedural obstacle of standing. As a general rule,
courts have not recognized the standing of nonresidents to contest local
zoning ordinances. Consequently, those individuals who are most likely
to assert regional interests seldom have their day in court.
A. Methodology
The authority to zone is grounded in the police power of the
enacting municipality, which is generally described as the power to
impose regulations reasonably related to promotion of the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of the public. 5 Courts that have introduced
regional perspectives in zoning decisions, therefore, have justified their
action as an appropriate incident of their authority to review the
reasonableness of an exercise of local police power. Following this
approach, the courts have had to consider the scope of the term
"public" in determining the extent that municipalities may make
provincial use of zoning power. Although the Supreme Court early
observed in Euclid" that a general public interest might outweigh the
interest of a single municipality, courts have continued to define
"public" so as to exclude persons who are not residents of the zoning
jurisdiction.4 7 In determining the validity of controls over private land
use, therefore, the welfare of nonresidents has often been considered
45. The existence and scope of the police power does not stem from any specific constitutional
authorization. Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress given the power to enact a law simply
because it promotes the general welfare, and provision for a broad police power is similarly absent
from state constitutions. Nevertheless, the courts have assumed the police power to be a necessary
element of effective government. See Becker, supra note 20, at 267.
46. "It is not meant by this, however, [in sustaining the districting of Euclid as a valid police
power exercise] to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far
outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the
way." 272 U.S. at 390.
47. E.g., Ex parte Ackerman, 6 Cal. App. 5, 91 P. 429 (Ct. App. 1907); Cook County v.
Chicago, 311 Ill. 234, 142 N.E. 512 (1924); R.BABCOCK, supra note 6, at 176-77; Note, supra note




irrelevant. In recent years, however, a number of courts have required
that the exercise of municipal police power encompass the welfare of
public interests outside the enacting community, and have not hesitated
to invalidate local ordinances found to be detrimental to the welfare of
the larger public. 8 Invalid ordinances, however, are held to be beyond
the power of the municipal zoning authority rather than
unconstitutional.4 These courts reason that the "public" whose welfare
is served by any exercise of the state police power necessarily includes all
residents of the state. Since the power delegated to the municipalities
must be as limited as that of the state, a local exercise of power that
adversely affects the welfare of any resident cannot be permitted s°
Although this argument is not entirely convincing, it is clear that a test
of reasonableness should include all persons affected, regardless of
whether they reside in the zoning municipality. 51
B. Situations in Which Courts Have Considered Regional Perspectives
The decisional law reveals three situations in which extraterritorial
considerations have been used in reviewing zoning legislation.
Unfortunately, no clear-cut principles of regionalism in zoning have
evolved from these instances of judicial inquiry beyond municipal
boundaries. If anything, these cases demonstrate how regional
perspectives have been only restrictively employed.
1. Intergovernmental Conflicts. -When a municipality zones land
located on its border differently from land in an adjacent community, 52
courts have frequently examined regional criteria. The challenge of
inconsistent classification usually arises when a resident landowner asks
the court to consider the zoning ordinance of the adjoining municipality
as evidence that the local restriction is unreasonable.53 Thus, in the
48. E.g., Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955); Borough of
Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (L. Div. 1953), affd, 15 N.J. 238,
104 A.2d 441 (1954).
49. See Feiler, Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. URBAN L. 319, 338-39 (1970). The
courts have often failed to distinguish between "reasonableness" in the ultra vires sense and
"reasonableness" as a vehicle for determining the validity of state action when challenged on
fourteeth amendment grounds. 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 161 n.5 (1963).
50. See Comment, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach. 114 U. PA. L. REV.
1251, 1254 (1966).
51. See B. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1961); Becker, supra
note 13, at 14. But see Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 77,
141 A.2d 851, 859 (1958) (Bell, J., dissenting) (dangers of a broad concept of general welfare
demonstrated). See generally McDougal, The Influence of the Metropolis on Concepts, Rules, and
Institutions Relating to Property, 4 J. PuB. L. 93 (1955).
52. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
53. In most instances the classification of adjoining land is sought to be used as evidence that
1971]
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much-noted decision of Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a rezoning from residential to
commercial was invalid because the rezoned block was surrounded by
residential developments in three adjacent municipalities. Undoubtedly,
most courts today will analyze the character of land use in neighboring
towns before ruling on the validity of a local ordinance. 5
2. Exclusionary Practices. -Courts also have looked to
extraterritorial considerations when zoning ordinances either prevent
certain groups from living in a municipality or prohibit particular land
uses within its borders. 56 When these exclusionary practices are
challenged, courts frequently invoke regional criteria, such as the
availability of land outside the locality, in order to sustain the
restrictions. In the landmark case of Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township
of Wayne,57 the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on regional land
development needs to uphold a local minimum floor-space ordinance.
Moreover, in two far-reaching cases" the courts upheld local zoning
the zoned tract is restricted to a use for which it is unsuited. E.g., Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166,
180 N.E. 767 (1932) (since adjoining property was used commercially, plaintiff's land could not be
profitable utilized for residence); Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights, 372 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1963)
(the court found that the land in question was unsuited for residential development because of the
commercial uses in the adjoining city).
54. 15 N.J. 328, 104 A.2d 441 (1954), noted in 23 FORDHAM L. REV. 384 (1954) and 52 MICH.
L. REV. 1071 (1954). Rejecting the zoning municipality's contention that the responsibility of a
municipality for zoning halts at the municipal boundary without regard to the effect of its zoning
ordinance on adjoining municipalities, the court stated: "Such a view might prevail where there are
large undeveloped areas at the borders of two contiguous towns, but it cannot be tolerated where, as
here, the area is build up and one cannot tell when one is passing from one borough to another.
Knickerbocker Road and Massachusetts Avenue are not Chinese walls separating Dumont from the
adjoining boroughs." Id. at 247, 104 A.2d at 445.
55. Becker, supra note 13, at 8; Note, supra note 14, at 108.
56. For a discussion of zoning ordinances encountered in these cases see notes 25-27 supra
and accompanying text.
57. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). Lionshead Lake,
Inc., a developer, brought an action against the township challenging the validity of a minimum
floor area restriction on residential dwellings. The court noted that the ordinance protected Wayne
from the approaching wave of suburban development and ruled for the township. Professor Charles
Harr later commented: "[T]he only aspect of regionalism considered by the court was the
isolationist view of the township: that the city population would be spilling over into its
neighborhoods. This is localism, not an attempt at evaluating the interests of the broader
community. ... Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1953). See N. WILLIAMS, THE STRUCTURE OF URBAN ZONING 126-36 (1966);
Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. REV. 986 (1954); Nolan
& Horack, How Small a House?-Zoningfor Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HARV. L. REV.
967 (1954).
58. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955) (appropriate use of
property depends on nature of entire region in which municipality is located); Duffeon Concrete
Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949) (ordinance not arbitrary so
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ordinances excluding heavy industry from the community, reasoning
that the need for industrially zoned land had been satisfied by areas
beyond the community's border. Rarely have regional interests been
applied to invalidate a proposed exclusionary ordinance."
3. Placement and Operation of Regional Facilities.-A different
situation is presented when a local zoning practice is challenged on the
ground that it interferes with the placement of regional facilities." Some
courts, for example, have been asked to hold that a municipality has an
affirmative duty to zone in order to permit proper placement and
utilization of public facilities.6' Whether there is a municipal duty to
zone based on regional requirements is a question yet unanswered.
Although several courts have recognized a duty to serve a public that
extends beyond the local community,12 no court has invalidated a local
restriction on the sole ground that it is inconsistent with regional needs
for public facilities.6
long as business and industrial needs are supplied by other accessible areas in the community at
large). Most of the cases have involved exclusion of eleemosynary institutions. See Comment,
Zoning Against the Public Welfare: Judicial Limitations on Municipal Parochialism. 71 YALE L.J.
720 (1962).
59. Compare National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965)
(invalidating a 4-acre minimum lot requirement on the ground that the effect on the residential
region as a whole must be considered), with Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Township,
37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962) (local ordinance excluding trailers from township upheld despite
vigorous dissent). See also Green, New Trends in Zoning as Recognized by Court Decisions, 6 INST.
PLANNING & ZONING 1 (1965).
60. In the previous 2 situations the courts merely extend the area that will be examined in
determining reasonableness of local zoning. Here the courts must extend the conception of the police
power in judging the validity of local ordinances. See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text.
61. Arguably, the statutory language in most state enabling acts that zoning be "in
accordance with a comprehensive plan" could be interpreted to require a local entity to zone in
conformity with a regional plan or employ regional considerations. The courts, however, have taken
a much more narrow view of the provision, finding that it does not even require a municipal plan.
See generally Haar, "'In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARV. L. Rav. 1154 (1955);
38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 161, 162-63 (1963).
62. "At the very least Dumont owes a duty to hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoining
municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much
consideration to their rights as they would to those of residents and taxpayers of Dumont. To do less
would be to make a fetish out of invisible municipal boundary lines and a mockery of the principles
of zoning." Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 242, 104 A.2d 441, 445-46
(1954). See R. BABCOCK, supra note 6, at 178; note 54 supra and accompanying text.
63. E.g., Wrigley Properties, Inc. v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963) (ordinance
upheld despite landowner's contention that the residential classification was invalid because of
regional need for shopping center); Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d
749 (1958) (unsuccessful attack on exclusion of apartments based on regional need for more
multiple dwelling units). The Dumont case has been cited, however, as a situation in which an
ordinance was held invalid on the ground that it was not in harmony with regional needs. 38
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 161, 163 n.13 (1963).
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C. The Obstacle of Standing
The divisive structure and administration of zoning laws have
placed the burden of raising regional issues on outsiders and persons not
originally involved in the zoning proceedings. This result is partially
attributable to the tendency of communities to employ land use controls
as protective devices. Residents of a suburban community enacting an
exclusionary ordinance, for example, are not likely to challenge the
validity of the self-serving provision. Outsiders prevented from living or
finding employment in the community, however, have a legitimate
interest in attacking the ordinance. Unfortunately, outsiders
traditionally have been denied standing to seek judicial review of the
ordinance. It is clear that the procedural concept of standing is the most
formidable obstacle to effective judicial consideration of regional
perspectives." One reason that nonresidents have been denied standing in
zoning cases is the traditional judicial reluctance to usurp the legislative
function and decide controversial economic and social issues. A second
and more important cause has been the judicial tendency to impose rigid
standing requirements for review of both administrative zoning decisions
and constitutional challenges to zoning legislation.
1. The Statutory Law.-Most state enabling statutes, like the
Standard State Enabling Act,65 provide that zoning appeals may be
taken to a court by "any person aggrieved" by a decision of an
administrative officer." Anomalously, most of the statutes fail to define
who is a "person aggrieved" and courts have had to determine what
kind of nexus with the administrative zoning decision entitles a person to
judicial review. In addition to providing a general right of appeal to
persons aggrieved, however, a few states have specified the standing
requirements for contesting zoning restrictions. 67 In New Jersey, for
64. The courts also have made frequent use of 2 other procedural rubrics in order to side-step
troublesome zoning issues: (1) that one challenging a zoning ordinance has the burden of proving it
unreasonable, capricious,and arbitrary, and (2) that the courts will not interfere with the legislative
process when a debatable question is shown. Feiler, supra note 49, at 33. Standing is obviously the
most insurmountable procedural barrier because if the plaintiff is denied standing he cannot begin
to attack the regulation on the merits.
65. See note I supra.
66. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-8 (Supp. 1969). The majority of states use the same
language in describing who can appeal an administrative decision to a higher administrative body.
Tennessee, for example, has the aggrieved language for appeal to the board of appeals, but not to the
courts. TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-706 (1956). A few statutes only provide that a "party of record"
may appeal the administrative determination. 3 R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 21.05 (1968). See generally Comment, Standing to Appeal Zoning Determinations: The
"Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 MICH. L. Rav. 1070 (1966); Note, The "Aggrieved Person"
Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 294 (1967).
67. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 14759 (1957) ("any taxpayer").
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example, a recently enacted statute allows any person, whether residing
within or without the municipality, to challenge the zoning laws." New
York apparently recognizes the standing of a town to seek judicial
review of a village's rezoning of land abutting the town's border."'
2. Judicial Construction of the Requisite Interest for
Standing. -There are two kinds of suits that may be brought to
challenge local zoning practices. The first is an appeal to the courts to
seek judicial review of a decision by an administrative body. The second
is a suit challenging the constitutionality of zoning legislation. The
courts have often failed to distinguish the kind of suit in which a standing
question is presented. The courts also have repeatedly assumed that the
requisite interest to be a "person aggrieved" by an administrative
zoning decision 70 is identical with the interest necessary to raise
constitutional claims. The principles that have evolved with respect to
standing for review of administrative decisions, therefore, have had equal
application in determining who can litigate constitutional zoning
questions. This equating of standing requirements, however, appears to
be clearly erroneous. In the first place, the relevant statutory provisions
apply only to the standing requirements for appealing administrative
decisions. 7' Moreover, entirely different policy questions are presented
by the two situations.
(a) General requirements for standing. -The weight of authority
is that for a person to be aggrieved within the meaning of the statutes, he
must be specially, personally, and adversely affected by the
administrative determination. In order for an individual to prove that he
was personally affected, most courts have required some showing of a
legal or an equitable interest in the property subject to the zoning
decision. 72 Obviously, under this restrictive view, residents and
68. "[A]ny person, whether residing within or without the municipality, whose right to use,
acquire, or enjoy property is or may be effected by any action taken under the act to which this act is
a supplement, or whose rights to use, acquire, or enjoy property . . . under any other law of this
State or of the United States have been denied, violated or infringed by an action or a failure to act
.... N.J. REv. STAT. § 40:55-47.1 (Supp. 1970).
69. No state statute permitting towns to do this has been found, but a county administrative
law authorizing the practice was cited in Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 34 App. Div.
2d 687, 312 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1970). But see Village of Russell Gardens v. Board of Zoning and
Appeals, 30 Misc. 2d 392, 219 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (state statute expressly provides that
village shall not have right to review town's zoning determination).
70. Moreover, the courts have not imposed different requirements for standing to appeal
from one administrative echelon to another and standing to initiate judicial review. See R.
ANDERSON, supra note 66, § 16.11.
71. See Comment, supra note 66, at 1072 n. 15; notes 98-101 infra and accompanying text.
72. E.g., Gregorio v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 232 A.2d 330 (1967); Victoria
Corp. v. Atlanta Merchandise Mart, Inc., 101 Ga. App. 163, 112 S.E.2d 793 (1960); Bryniarski v.
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nonresidents alike who do not have a proprietary interest in the specific
tract of zoned land would never be entitled to judicial review.7 3 To
remedy this result, most courts have held that a person without a
property interest in the zoned land has a right to review if he can prove
damages to his own property that are not generally shared with other
property owners. 74 As a general rule, people who do not own property are
denied standing altogether. 75 Despite this seemingly uniform prerequisite
of individual loss, the case law is replete with inconsistent decisions on
standing. 76 When a resident of the zoning municipality owns land that
abuts the property subject to the challenged zoning regulations, for
example, special damages have been deemed to accrue prima facie.
7
1 If
the property does not abut, however, the requirements for special
damages have been more stringent. Hence, the more removed the
interested party's property is from the zoned tract, the more peculiar and
substantial must be his injury in order for him to have standing.78
(b) Standing requirements for nonresidents. -Most courts have
held that a person who owns property adjacent to the zoned property but
who lives outside the zoning municipality cannot challenge its zoning
ordinances. 79 Consequently, the mere fact of nonresidency has frequently
prevented interested persons from qualifying as aggrieved parties.8 A
few courts, however, have permitted nonresidents to attack the land use
Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967). Some courts have allowed
much greater latitude than others in determining the qualifications of a party as an aggrieved
person. These courts have taken a broader view in the interpretation of the provision and allowed an
appeal as a matter of right as long as a party is adversely affected in fact within the scope of the
zoning ordinance. E.g., O'Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A.2d 515 (1953);
D'Almeida v. Sheldon Realty Co., 252 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1969); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 22.16 (1958).
73. See generally Foss, Interested Third Parties in Zoning, 12 U. FIA. L. Rav. 16 (1959).
74. E.g., Garner v. County of DuPage, 8 Ill. 2d 155, 133 N.E.2d 303 (1956); Downey v.
Incorporated Village of Ardsley, 152 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1956), affd mem., 3 App. Div. 2d
663, 158 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1957). Allowing other persons a right to review seems basic to zoning
theory because zoning statutes almost uniformly provide for notice and inclusion of the general
public in hearings before the zoning board. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 66, at § 21.05. For a
discussion of what constitutes special damages see 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 7.91 (1968).
75. 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 74, at § 7.93.
76. See Comment, supra note 66, at 1079.
77. See Heady v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 139 Conn. 463, 94 A.2d 789 (1953); Elwyn v. City
of Miami, 113 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
78. Compare Toomey v. Gomeringer, 235 Md. 456,201 A.2d 842 (1964) (owner of property 2
blocks away had standing), with Pattison v. Corby, 226 Md. 97, 172 A.2d 490 (1961) (no right to
appeal for owner of property considerably distant from and out-of-sight of affected property).
79. E.g., Clark v. City of Colorado Springs, 162 Colo. 593, 428 P.2d 359 (1967) (en banc).
80. See generally Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes
From a Dark Continent, 55 IOWA L. REV. 344 (1969).
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controls of neighboring municipalities. Implicit in these decisions has
been a recognition that property interests may be adversely affected by a
political entity in which the landowner has no representation.81 This
extension of standing to nonresidents has logically accompanied the
growing judicial awareness of the need to consider regional
circumstances in local zoning determinations.8 2 Citing the Dumont8 3 case
for the proposition that the general public, both without and within the
zoning jurisdiction, has an interest in the zoning regulations enacted, a
Connecticut court, in Hamelin v. Zoning Board,' held that nonresidents
had standing to appeal because their injury was manifested by their
participation in lower administrative hearings. Similarly, in Koppel v.
City of Fairway," the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted a state statute
authorizing "affected property owners" to challenge zoning action to
include nonresident owners of adjacent property. Although several
commentators have foreseen a trend toward recognizing the interests of
nonresidents in local land use decisions, 8 it seems clear that the vast
majority of courts do not grant standing to nonresidents. Moreover, the
few courts that have recognized the standing of nonresidents are far from
agreement on the nature of the interest required.
87
All courts agree that interest groups composed of nonresidents,
such as civil rights organizations, do not have standing. Surprisingly,
even civic and property owners' organizations composed of residents of
the enacting municipality are seldom held to be aggrieved persons for
purposes of appealing zoning regulations.88 It is not unlikely that the
81. 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 161, 163 (1963).
82. See notes 45-63 supra and accompanying text.
83. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
84. 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (New Haven County C.P. 1955).
85. 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962). In this case, the protests of nonresidents had been
ignored by the city council in passing a zoning amendment that rezoned land on the city's border
from residential to commercial. The court also interpreted a statute requiring a greater affirmative
vote by the council if a certain percentage of nearby owners protested to include all property owners
within the prescribed area regardless of residency.
86. Comment, supra note 66, at 1080; Note, supra note 66, at 304.
87. Compare Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d 96 (1963) (nonresidents
who owned adjacent property had right to intervene in action brought by resident property owner),
and Al Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 372 (1957) (nonresident who
faced potential loss of business as result of zoning ordinance had sufficient interest ot give him
standing), with Krembs v. County of Cook, 121 I11. App. 2d 97, 257 N.E.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1970)
(although land zoned by county was contiguous, city was not entitled to intervene), and Wood v.
Freeman, 43 Misc. 2d 616, 251 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. 1964), affd, 24 App. Div. 2d 704, 262
N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965) (nonresident owners of property contiguous to subject property not aggrieved
persons).
88. E.g., Shore Acres Improvement Ass'n v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Appeals, 251 Md.
310, 247 A.2d 402 (1968) (association not aggrieved); Lido Beach Civic Ass'n v. Board of Zoning
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reluctance to grant standing to these groups is motivated by a desire to
avoid the difficult decision of whether a group may assert the rights of its
members.8' It is well settled, however, that the zoning municipality may
be an aggrieved person within the meaning of the statutes authorizing a
right to review,'" and municipalities are frequently allowed to contest the
decisions of their own zoning boards.' 1 Concomitant with the extension
of standing to nonresidents, there is some authority that a neighboring
community may contest a zoning determination under a statutory grant
of review.' 2 Considerable confusion exists, however, concerning the
capacity in which the suit must be brought and the kind of injury that
must be alleged by the aggrieved community. Ordinarily, local
governments lack standing to sue in behalf of their constituents, 3 and
this rule has carried over into the zoning context. In City of Greenbelt v.
Jaeger," for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the city
lacked standing to attack the rezoning of contiguous property because it
neither claimed nor showed that it was aggrieved other than in its
representative capacity. Similarly, a New York court ruled in Town of
Huntington v. Town Board of the Town of Oyster Bay 95 that a town did
not have standing as an aggrieved person even though it claimed that the
zoning would cause economic injury. When an adjacent community
alleges some specific injury either to its property or its corporate
Appeals, 13 App. Div. 2d 1030, 217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1961). But see Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100.872
(1962).
89. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 72, § 22.06. See also Sedler, Standing to Assert
Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962).
90. See Town of Somerset v. County Council, 229 Md. 42, 181 A.2d 671 (1962); 3 R.
ANDERSON, stpra note 65, § 21.11.
91. E.g., City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965) (city is proper
party to appeal because of interest in effectuation of zoning policies).
92. E.g., Borough of Leonia v. Borough of Ft. Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 151 A.2d 540 (App.
Div. 1959) (the right of Leonia to bring an action against a zoning amendment by Ft. Lee was not
questioned); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (L. Div.
1953), affd, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954) (since nonresidents had tanding, it was immaterial
whether the municipal plaintiff had adequate status to challenge the ordinance).
93. 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 74, § 16.00.
94. 237 Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694 (1965). Although noting that the municipality has a right to
appeal if it is a party aggrieved in its own right, the court said: "Even if it be further assumed that
there were citizens or residents of Greenbelt who were aggrieved by the rezoning ordered. . . it is
clear that an association or corporate body representing only the viewpoint of its members is not
itself aggrieved merely because its members are." Id. at 463, 206 A.2d at 698.
95. 57 Misc. 2d 821, 293 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1968). In this case Huntington brought a
proceeding to review the grant of a special exception for a proposed shopping center by Oyster Bay.
The corporation that was granted the exception owned land in Huntington, but the subject parcel
was in Oyster Bay. Dismissing Huntington's contention that the zoning action would require it to
spend vast sums of money to enlarge its roads to accommodate the increased traffic to the shopping
center, the court found that Huntington had no right to dictate zoning in Oyster Bay.
NONRESIDENT ZONING CHALLENGES
capacity, however, it will normally be allowed to maintain the zoning
suit."
D. Evaluation
The judiciary has not taken an active role in eliminating problems
attributable to zoning fragmentation. In adjudging the reasonableness of
the exercise of municipal zoning power, courts generally have
disregarded the interests of the public outside the community. Moreover,
they usually have examined regional effects of local zoning only at the
instance of residents who are relying on regional criteria to sustain
zoning ordinances. The strict requirements for standing to contest local
zoning ordinances is the greatest obstacle to more frequent and objective
judicial consideration of the regional impact of zoning. State courts have
constructed a law of standing in zoning litigation that is considerably
more artificial and less satisfactory than in other areas of state judicial
review.'7 Standing has been made solely dependent upon geographical
proximity and jurisdictional boundaries. Moreover, in applying their
restrictive tests, state courts have failed to distinguish between the
requirements for standing to initiate review of administrative zoning
decisions and standing to challenge the constitutionality of zoning
legislation.'" The equation of standing requirements in both instances
may mean that an individual who is harmed by unconstitutional
governmental action may be denied relief in state court although he
would be entitled to relief in federal court. In the latter forum, state court
interpretations of standing prerequisites are not controlling and, in order
to attack the constitutionality of the legislative act, the challenging party
is required by recent federal decisions only to show that he is harmed by
the challenged law." No primacy is placed on proprietary interest in the
zoned district or damage different from that of the public at large.
96. See 1969 Duic L.J. 841, 842.
97. By and large, state courts have thrown their judicial doors open to anyone who asserts a
legitimate interest in review of other administrative action. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing,
37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 450, 468 (1970). The rigidity with respect to zoning seems to be attributable to
the influence of nuisance law in this area. Foss, supra note 73, at 27.
98. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 66, § 21.04. For a suggestion that this uniform treatment
is not necessarily undesirable see Ayer, supra note at 80, at 372 n. 162.
99. See notes 111-14 infra and accompanying text. The law of standing to raise federal
constitutional issues was formerly governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968); it is uncertain to what extent that case is superceded by the Data Processing
rationale. Under the former decision, plaintiff must merely demonstrate a sufficient nexus between
his status and the nature of the alleged unconstitutional governmental action to support his claim of
standing. See generally Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968). See
also I C. ANTIEAU, supra note 74, § 4.24.
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Anomalously, a nonresident who is substantially harmed by a local
enactment could attack its constitutionality in federal court, but may be
unable to obtain state court review of an administrative decision under
the enactment.' ® This failure to distinguish the kind of action that is
being challenged also has importance in determining the application of
the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.101
IV. A RESPONSE TO THE EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS
Broadening the concept of standing in zoning controversies would
be an effective judicial response to the plight of persons excluded from
many suburban communities by zoning controls. The volume of recent
literature concerning exclusionary zoning and the growing number of
suits in the area suggest that suburban zoning ordinances are coming
under strong constitutional attack. Therefore, since standing is
essentially a determination that a plaintiff who has been injured deserves
to be heard and is not an adjudication on the merits, the existing barriers
to recognizing the right of nonresidents to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices should be eliminated in order to allow consideration of these
constitutional issues. Furthermore, permitting nonresidents to seek
judicial review of zoning decisions would promote consideration of
regional needs and reduce the problems of fragmentation in zoning.
A. Current Developments
There has been much recent commentary on the discriminatory
character of suburban zoning laws.10 2 Most commentators have
addressed the problem of whether a pattern of urban slums and
segregated suburbs denies the urban poor equal protection of the law and
have concluded, as stated by one authority, that "no small number of
100. In most cases the elements of aggrievement under state law will be the same as that
necessary for assertion of constitutional claims. In states where nonresidents may not sue as persons
aggrieved, however, they would be entitled to assert constitutional issues in federal court if they are
injured in fact. See notes 111-14 infra and accompanying text. Of course, outsiders denied standing
to raise their constitutional claims at the state level could seek relief in federal court. Moreover, they
could attack the state standing requirements as violations of equal protection to the extent they were
discriminated against as nonresidents.
101. Generally, when the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is attacked, the usual
administrative remedial procedure need not be pursued before institution of judicial proceedings. I
C. ANTIEAU, supra note 74, §§ 4.24, 7.94; 8A E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 25.283 (3d ed. 1965). But see Igna v. City of Baldwin Park, 9 Cal. App. 3d 909,
88 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Ct. App. 1970) (property owner was required to exhaust administrative remedies
before challenging constitutional validity of zoning ordinance).
102. E.g., Aloi, Goldberg, & White, supra note 10; Becker, supra note 20; Sager, supra note
20; Williams, supra note 22; Note, supra note 26.
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constitutional fatalities would accompany a constitutional campaign in
this area."10 3 No doubt encouraged by these observations, those of
limited means who find themselves shut out from the suburbs are
beginning to shape a broad attack against local zoning restrictions.
Aided by civil rights organizations, builders, and some businesses that
have moved to the suburbs, the excluded classes are pressing the courts
and the legislatures for changes in zoning laws.'I The federal judiciary
has not proved unresponsive to their claims. Although all of the recent
cases have concerned suits initiated by residents, these decisions clearly
evidence an innovation of federal constitutional standards in the review
of zoning ordinances that should be equally applicable to challenges
made by nonresidents. One court, for example, has ruled that a
municipality's rezoning of residential land into a recreational tract to
prevent the construction of low-cost housing violated the equal
protection clause.0 5 Another court invalidated a state constitutional
requirement that a local referendum be held to decide whether federally
funded low-income housing can be built in the community. 106 In
addition, state courts are now being asked to adjudicate suits brought
against discriminatory municipal land use controls by members of the
local community. In Baskerville v. Town of Montclair, 0 7 for example, a
103. Sager, supra note 20, at 799.
104. In Massachusetts the legislature has passed a law that could require each municipality to
zone at least 1.5% of its land for low-income housing. See Conti, supra note 20. New Jersey has
statutorily broadened the number of people entitled to standing (see note 68 supra and
accompanying text) and is considering a new enabling law that provides: "'[l]n no event shall any
zoning ordinance be deemed to have a valid objective if the effect of such ordinance is to exclude
racial, religious, or ethnic minorities." Aloi, Goldberg, & White, supra note 10, at 104. Mention
should be made here of the Housing and Urban Development Department's controversial program
to extend low-cost public housing into the suburbs. See Karmin, Romney's Departure Grows More
Likely, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16, 1970, at 10, col. 3.
105. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.
1970). Another important case is Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill.
1969), noted in 22 VAND. L. REv. 1386 (1969), in which the court held that equal protection is
violated when a public housing authority's site selection policies are deliberately designed to
maintain existing patterns of residential segregation.
106. Valtierra v. Housing Auth., 313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970), prob. juris. noted sub
nor. James v. Valtierra, 398 U.S. 949 (1970). A 3-judge panel found the requirement illegal, since
other federally assisted projects such as highway construction, hospitals, and college dormitories
have no similar impediments.
107. No. L-25287-68 P.W. (N.J. Super., Mar. 30, 1970). Among the plaintiffs were many
low-income Negro residents of the community that imposed a $35,000 minimum cost restriction on
rezoning of a subdivision of single-family homes. They alleged that the ordinance violated New
Jersey law and the thirteenth and fourteenth amendment rights of black citizens. Defendants
challenged the right of plaintiffs to attack the ordinance. Noting that the subdivision developer and
residents of the surrounding area were not likely to contest the ordinance, the court concluded that
since zoning serves the public at large and the community, plaintiffs had the right to have a court
determine whether the municipality could by legislation fix the construction costs of new houses.
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lower New Jersey court found that a minimum construction cost
requirement was unrelated to the health, safety, or general welfare of the
community and thus in excess of municipal zoning power.
Coupled with the increasing application of constitutional standards
to exclusionary zoning practices, the liberalization of federal standing
requirements in two recent cases should have a significant impact in
allowing more litigation of zoning issues. First, in a development
specifically related to zoning, the Second Circuit decided in Township of
River Vale v. Town of Orangetown'" that a municipal corporation is a
"person" under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for
purposes of attacking a zoning ordinance of a contiguous municipality.
The court's ruling that economic damage is a sufficient interest to give a
township standing to raise constitutional claims'" may persuade state
courts to broaden their conception of standing for constitutional
purposes. Although the court's reasoning was premised on the zoning
municipality's location in another state,"0 it also may influence the
states to interpret their nonconstitutional rules of standing to allow
adjoining communities to attack each other's zoning administrative
decisions. Secondly, recent Supreme Court decisions culminating in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp"'
have liberalized the federal law of standing as a whole. Rejecting the
traditional "legal interest" test and noting a trend toward enlargement
of the class of people who may protest administrative action," 2 the Court
108. 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968), noted in 1969 DuKE L.J. 841; 83 HARV. L. REv. 679 (1970).
River Vale, New Jersey, and Orangetown, New York, are residential municipalities having the state
line as a common border. Orangetown adopted an amendment to its zoning code rezoning a tract of
land contiguous to River Vale from residential to "office park." River Vale sought declaratory
relief and damages, contending that the ordinance was "arbitrary and capricious" and that it so
depreciated property values as to constitute a deprivation of due process. The district court
dismissed the suit on the ground that River Vale was not directly affected by the ordinance and that
a municipality is not a "person" within the terms of the fourteenth amendment.
109. River Vale specifically averred that the anticipated property devaluation would result in
a decline of tax revenues and that increased expenditures would be necessitated to handle the
resulting traffic. The court's recognition of River Vale's economic damage was not compelled by
primary authority. But see Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (township
owning real estate with in its limits had sufficient interest to maintain suit to enjoin federal
government form erecting "model community" which would impair its property value); 1969 DuKE
L.J. 841,845.
110. Finding contrary precedents inapposite because they involved municipalities attempting
to assert federal constitutional rights against their creator, the court concluded that River Vale was
a private corporation vis-a-vis New York. 403 F.2d at 686. For a suggestion that the court's
conceptual analysis is faulty since it leads to a dual legal nature for the municipal corporation see 83
HARV. L. REv. 679,680 (1970).
111. 397 U.S. 150 (1970), noted in 23 VAND. L. Rev. 814 (1970).
112. "Where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of people
who may protest administrative action. The whole drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved
.persons' is symptomatic of that trend ... " 397 U.S. at 154.
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has formulated a new two-fold test for standing: first, whether the
plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise, and secondly, whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." mUndoubtedly, under this new test, many more plaintiffs have
standing to litigate the constitutionality of zoning ordinances in federal
court. It remains to be seen whether more ready access to the federal
forum in zoning disputes will lead to a liberalization of state standing
requirements."'
B. Prospective Developments
Of even greater significance than the application of constitutional
standards for review of suits by residents of the zoning municipality will
be the extension of these standards to actions brought by nonresidents
challenging local zoning practices. Since nonresidents seldom have a
voice in the local zoning decisions of a community, they are frequently
the targets of exclusionary regulations.115 In practice it is nonresidents
who will take parochial legislation to court and their interests should be
recognized. Extending the class of persons entitled to invoke
constitutional claims to include nonresidents would ease considerably
the task of challenging zoning laws.
Further liberalization of the standing requirements for nonresidents
is not just a remote possibility. An important case, Lake Nelson Estates,
Inc. v. Township of Piscataway,"' is now pending in the New Jersey
courts. In this action black nonresidents are seeking, on behalf of
themselves and similar black persons who are, as a class, excluded from
suburban homes, to challenge the constitutionality of ordinances that
require one-acre lot sizes and prohibit multi-family housing. "7 Plaintiffs
113. The Court intimated that the only constitutional requirement for standing is injury in
fact. The inquiry into the zone of interests is solely for judicial policy reasons. See Davis, supra note
97. In his article Professor Davis strongly criticizes the second part of the new test and opts for a
single test for standing with injury in fact as the main focus.
114. One author has observed that, since the law of zoning has been cut adrift from the
federal forum, there has been no maturing body of federal precedents in local land use regulation.
He concludes that "the time may have come to adopt some of the federal learning at the local
level." Ayer, supra note 80, at 371.
115. The restrictions in zoning are not unlike restrictions on interstate commerce that
principally affect out-of-state residents. In federal cases dealing with discriminatory practices,
outsiders have had standing to contest the validity of the state legislative action. See Comment,
supra note 50, at 1254 n.21.
116. (N.J. Super. Ct., L. Div., filed June 23, 1970) in N.Y. Times, June 23, 1970, at 33, col. 5.
117. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the zoning limitations of Piscataway
1971]
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allege that they have standing to sue pursuant to a state statute allowing
outsiders to redress the denial of rights to use, acquire, and enjoy real
property118 and, in the alternative, that they have standing to test the
validity of action that violates rights secured under the Constitution.
Even if the reasoning is based on statutory grounds, a decision in this
case acknowledging the standing of nonresidents would have
considerable influence on other state courts because of its requisite
cognition that nonresidents have an interest in not having housing within
their means zoned out of a municipality in which they wish to live.
C. Evaluation
It is submitted that all those who are injured in fact by a local
zoning decision should be permitted to seek judicial review. It should
make no difference whether the zoning practice is challenged on
administrative or constitutional grounds. The injury-in-fact test is a
valid guide both for construing the statutory term "persons aggrieved"
and for determining who is entitled to raise constitutional claims.
Whether injury exists should not depend on proprietary interest in or
geographical proximity to the property subject to a zoning restriction,
but rather on the severity of the wrong done to the party seeking judicial
protection. If the injury is substantial,' then the party should have
standing, unless public policy or legislative intent require that his interest
not be shielded. 20 Moreover, a person injured in fact should have
standing regardless of whether he has an interest that is statutorily or
constitutionally protected."' This would preclude the courts from using
unconstitutionally prevent them from using, acquiring, and enjoying real property and securing jobs
in the community. Furthermore, they maintain that the enabling legislation's vagueness, coupled
with its failure to enunciate proper standards for determining what promotes the general welfare of
citizens, allows definite patterns of racial and economic segregation to develop among
municipalities in New Jersey in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
118. See note 68 supra and accompanying text. The case is said to be the first instituted under
the new statute. See N.Y. Times, June 23, 1970, at 33, col. 4 (city ed.).
119. See Note, supra note 66, at 307 (if a party can show that he is being damaged in any
substantial way by a zoning decision, the courts should liberally construe "aggrieved person"
requirement so as to allow standing); 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 161, 165 (1963) (standing should be
granted if an individual has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct and
certain injury).
120. For policy reasons the cdurts could refuse standing to a nonresident businessman who is
seeking to avoid competition or to an adjoining municipality that is competing with the zoning
municipality for an attractive industry.
121. Professor Davis argues that an equity court has always had power to decide whether or
not to provide protection to nonstatutory and nonconstitutional interests. He suggests that the
second part of the Data Processing test denies standing to many persons with nonconstitutional
interests who had standing under pre- 1968 law. Davis, supra note 97, at 472.
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the concept of standing to avoid deciding whether the plaintiff is harmed
by the challenged law. Ifjudicial review is thought undesirable, the use of
other doctrines of justiciability would be more appropriate. 122 The
injury-in-fact test insures that the necessary concrete adverseness is
present for litigation of constitutional issues and that the plaintiff is not
a mere intermeddler in the administrative process. It accords standing to
non-residents whether or not they have a constitutional "right" to a
suburban home or job,12 provided they can demonstrate economic or
other injury in the form of commuting expenses, loss of a job, or
deprivation of amenities. Similarly, the test permits an adjacent
community to sue for a wide variety of economic injuries. 24 In reviewing
the standing of persons or nearby communities challenging municipal
zoning ordinances under this test, the courts will be compelled to
consider the full range of exclusionary effects on the plaintiff.1ss In this
manner the liberal test will promote more efficacious judicial
consideration of extraterritorial needs.
Liberalizing the law of standing in zoning disputes will likely lead to
judicial resolution of issues that have not been extensively litigated. An
oft-repeated response to suggestions that the judiciary ought to play a
more active role in eliminating discrimination from the administration
of local zoning laws has been that the courts are ill-equipped to decide
the proper allocation of land resources and that the controversial aspects
of exclusionary zoning are best left to the legislature. 26 Similarly,
recommendations that the right to judicial review of zoning decisions be
extended to nonresidents have elicited the characteristic floodgate
response. 2 7 Whatever the merits of judicial activism, the evils of
parochialism in land use regulation are just as prevalent as those of
racial discrimination in the public schools and legislative
apportionment. 28 As long as the legislatures continue to ignore the
122. Ayer, supra note 79, at 352-53; Davis, supra note 97, at 473.
123. For a discussion of whether a house in suburbia is an economic right secured by the
Constitution see Aloi, Goldberg, & White, supra note 10, at 80.
124. See notes 92-96, 108-110 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 28-30, 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
126. E.g., Becker, supra note 13, at 18-19; Bowe, supra note 8, at 163; Haar, supra note 37, at
530; Note, supra note 14, at 124-25; 38 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 161, 167-68 (1963).
127. See Ayer, supra note 80, at 366. But see Garner v. County of DuPage, 8 111. 2d 155, 133
N.E.2d 303 (1956) (unless standing restrictions applied, harassing suits by persons not aggrieved
would ensue). Harassment and extensive litigation have not been experienced in jurisdictions that
have permitted nonresidents to challenge the validity of zoning ordinances. 3 K. DAvIs, supra note
72, § 22.10.
128. R. BABCOCK, supra note 6, at 176-77. It is surprising that a federal judiciary that has
been so attuned to constitutional infringements in other areas has been so ambivalent in reviewing
allegations of constitutional injury by protective zoning devices.
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problems of fragmentation in land use policy, it is incumbent upon the
courts to act. Although the extension of standing to nonresidents will not
be a panacea for all the defects of a decentralized land development
program, 1 9 it will foster further judicial consideration of regional
criteria and expand the concept of the "public" on whose behalf zoning
power is exercised. 30 Coupled with the innovation of constitutional
standards in the review of zoning legislation, a broader concept of
standing will do much to counteract the exclusionary effects of
fragmentation in zoning.
V. CONCLUSION
Since zoning controls remain one of the last vestiges of local
governmental power, it is important that municipal land restrictions be
systematically evaluated to determine whether they are consistent with
modern metropolitan land use policies. Paradoxically, while substantial
progress has been made in providing for legislative and administrative
supervision of local regulations in public education and other areas, no
established framework exists for effectively combating the undesirable
effects of localism in zoning. As a consequence, the judiciary should be
encouraged to use its traditional power to review the exercise of police
power in order to introduce regional perspectives into land use
regulation. This Note has examined one procedural aspect of judicial
review and has explored the impact of its heretofore restrictive
application on injured nonresidents. It suggests that the extension of
standing to nonresidents will lead to more frequent judicial recognition
of regional perspectives by giving full consideration to all interests. It is
clear that this change in judicial procedure is necessary if the most
serious problem of fragmentation, exclusionary zoning, is to be
satisfactorily resolved.
KENT H. MCMAHAN
129. Some of the barriers to changing traditional patterns of land use controls are: (1) lack of
knowledge of effects of present regulations, (2) the use of fiscal zoning, (3) the lack of adequate staff
and professional expertise, and (4) the vested interests in the distribution of planning activities in
metropolitan areas. FRAGMENTATION, supra note 3, at 1 1-19. For an observation that the judiciary
is an ineffective guardian of the public and private interests in land development see SUBCOMM. ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 18, at 80. See also R. BABCOCK, supra note 6, at 152.
130. See notes 45-51 supra and accompanying text. Widening the scope of standing will
necessarily entail a widening of the scope of judicial review. See generally Vickers v. Township of
Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 262, 181 A.2d 129, 145 (1962).
[Vol. 24
